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comments  and  suggestions  at a later  stage. PROFITABILITY  AND THE TIME-VARYING  LIQUIDITY  PREMIUM  IN THE TERM 
STRUCTURE  OF INTEREST  RATES 
The  existence,  magnitude,  and  determinants  of  a.  "liquidity 
premium"  in the term structure  of interest rates have been a source 
of  controversy  in  the  analysis  of  interest  rate  behavior  for 
decades.  This issue has received  renewed attention  in the past few 
years  due to the  failure  of the  t@expectationstl  theory  of the term 
structure  to  perform  adequately  in  empirical  tests.  (See,  for 
example,  N. Gregory Mankiw  and Lawrence  Summers,  1984, and Mankiw, 
1986.)  The  expectations  theory,  which  holds  that  any  long-term 
interest  rate  must  equal  the  expectation  of  the  movements  in 
shorter-term  rates  over  the  term  to  maturity  of  the  long-term 
security,  is the  oldest'  theory  of  the  term  structure.  The  idea 
behind  this  theory,  which  Burton Malkiel  (1966, p.  17) says dates 
back  in some  form  "at least  to  Irving  Fisher,"  is that  arbitrage 
will prevent  a long-term  security  from yielding  more over its life 
than a combination  of shorter-term  securities  bought  consecutively 
over that holding  period.  Once  it is realized,  however,  that  the 
yields  on  the  shorter-term  securities  cannot  be  known  with 
certainty,  other considerations  than pure expectations  may need to 
be taken  into account. 
The extreme  opposite  to the expectations  theory  is the theory 
of  "segmented  markets,"  which  holds  that  borrowers  and  lenders 
participate  in specific  maturities  of securities  and  never  move. 
(See, for example, J.M. Culbertson,  1957.)  Thus the yield for each 
maturity  is determined  by  the  specific  supply  of  and  demand  for 2 
that  maturity.  This  is obviously  untenable  in its extreme  form, 
and  so  is  more  sensibly  replaced  by  the  idea  of  a  "preferred 
habitat"  for  participants,  who  will  only  depart  from  their 
preferred  maturities  if  yield  opportunities  are  particularly 
favorable  elsewhere.  (See  Franc0  Modigliani  and  Richard  Sutch, 
1966.)  This  captures  the notion  that  in the  face  of uncertainty 
arbitrage  on the basis of expectations  is risky and so risk-averse 
borrowers  and  lenders  will  require  an expected  premium  to abandon 
their  preferred  habitat. 
If the preferred  habitat  of most  lenders  is the  short  end of 
the  market  and  the  preferred  habitat  of  borrowers  the  long  end, 
there  will  be  a premium  in the  yield  of  longer-term  securities. 
As this type of habitat preference  represents  capital risk-aversion 
or fear of illiquidity,  the premium  may be said to be a liquidity 
premium.l  John  Hicks  (1978 (19391, Chap.  11) is usually  credited 
with  first  arguing  for  the  existence  of  this  tlconstitutional 
weakness"  in  the  long  end  of  the  loan  or  securities  market, 
following John Maynard Keynes's  (1971 [1930], Vol. II, pp. 127-129) 
discussion  of  the  existence  of  tlnormal backwardation,"  or  the 
premium  required  by speculators  in futures markets  to absorb price 
risk  from the hedgers.  Nicholas  Kaldor  (1939) and Michal  Kalecki 
(1939) contemporaneously  with  Hicks  also  presented  the  idea that 
'The premium  required to hold long-term rather than short-term 
securities  is  often  simply  referred  to  in the  literature  as  the 
risk  premium  or  the  term  premium.  Since  in  this  paper  we  are 
concerned  with  risk but with a particular  form of risk and we want 
to emphasize  its connection with J.M. Keynes's  liquidity preference 
theory,  we will  normally  use  liouiditv  premium. 3 
long-term  interest  rates  would  be  determined  by  expectations  of 
future movements  in short-term  rates plus  a liquidity  premium. 
There  have  been  numerous  empirical  studies  of  the  term 
structure.  Broadly, the evidence may be said to be consistent  with 
some influence  from expectations  plus the existence  of a liquidity 
premium.  Long  rates  or  the  spread  between  long  and  short  rates 
have seemed to be systematically  related to expectations  of future 
rates, though the expectations  embodied  in long rates or the'spread 
are  biased  upwards  as  the  liquidity  preference  theory  would 
predict.  The degree  of influence  of expectations  and the behavior 
of  the  liquidity  premium,  however,  have  remained  matters  of 
controversy.  In  several  recent  studies  (e.g.,  Robert  Shiller, 
1979; Shiller,  John  Campbell,  and Kermit  Schoenholtz,  1983;  David 
Jones  and Vance Roley,  1983; Mankiw  and Summers,.  1984; and Mankiw, 
1986) the expectations  theory  has performed  poorly,  even  allowing 
for the existence  of a constant  liquidity  premium,  in attempts  to 
test  the  joint  hypothesis  of  rational  expectations  and  the 
expectations  theory.  Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz  and Mankiw 
and Summers,  among  others,  have  suggested  renewing  the search  for 
the  determinants  of  a  time-varying  liquidity  premium  as  a 
possibility  for  explaining  what  is going  on  but  have  had  little 
success  themselves  in finding  such. 
The Time-Varying  Liquidity  Premium 
Earlier  work  on  variations  in  the  liquidity  premium  had 
focused on the issue of whether  or not the premium  varied  with the 
overall  level  of  interest  rates.  Findings  indicated  that  the premium did vary with the level of rates, 
found the variation to be  inverse, while 
4 
but some investigators 
others  found it to be 
direct.  Theoretical justifications were offered for both cases.* 
Recent work  attempting  to  explain time variations  in  liquidity 
premia, such as that of Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983) 
and Mankiw  (1986), has  used  various  measures  of  interest  rate 
volatility, such as the standard deviation of an interest rate or 
the covariance of bond  returns with  consumption growth  hr with 
stock market returns, in order to capture the riskiness involved 
in holding less liquid bonds. 
Tracy Mott (1985-86)  has suggested that the liquidity premium 
might  be  inversely  related  to  the  level  of  profitability  of 
business  fixed investment.  This is due to changes in liquidity 
preference which should accompany changes in the profitability of 
investment as greater or lesser desirability to invest in long- 
lived capital equipment and structures is matched by greater or 
lesser  desirability  of  investing  in  long-dated  financial 
securities.  The argument is intended to support Keynes's emphasis 
on the volatility  of  investment spending as the major  cause of 
economic  fluctuations.  Fluctuations  in  the  profitability  of 
investment, according to this argument, not only directly cause 
fluctuations  in  investment  spending  but  also  reinforce  and 
exacerbate  these  fluctuations by  sympathetic  movements  in  the 
availability of long-term finance. (See  also Joan Robinson, 1952.) 
*This  work is surveyed in  James Van Horne (1978,  pp. 101-103). 5 
This  financial  response  also  impedes  the power  of monetary  policy 
to offset  investment  fluctuations  by varying  the quantity  of bank 
reserves,  since an increase or decrease  in the quantity  of reserves 
may not get translated  easily  into an increase  or decrease  in the 
quantity  of long-term  lending  for fixed  investment. 
The origins of such a view concerning  the interactions  between 
physical  and financial  investment can be found in Keynes's Treatise 
on Money  (1971  [1930], Chaps.  10-11).  There  Keynes  proposed  that 
I. 
extra-normal  profits  in the  investment  goods  industries,  inducing 
expansion  in investment  spending,  would  occur  as the value  of new 
investment  goods  rose  above  the  cost  of  production  of  new 
investment  goods.  The  value  of  new  investment  goods  would  be 
determined  both  by  the  expected  profitability  of  these  goods  and 
the  interest  rate  used  to discount  them.  These  factors  in turn 
should  be determined  by the  resultant  of the beliefs  and  actions 
of financial  investors,  given their attitudes  towards  the state of 
the  real  and  financial  economy  and  the  credit  position  of  the 
central  bank.  This  reasoning  of  course .is identical  to  that  of 
James  Tobin's  11q88-theory  of investment.  (See, for example,  Tobin, 
1969.) 
Keynes  then  described  the  willingness  of  investors  to  move 
between  the  short  and  long  ends  of the  securities  market,  given 
the  availability  of credit  from the central  bank  and  the  banking 
system,  as  "the  degree  of  excess  bearishness."  In  the  General 
Theorv  Keynes  criticized  this  idea  as  involving  "a  confusion 
between  results  due to a change  in the rate of interest  and those 6 
due  to  a  change  in  the  schedule  of  the  marginal  efficiency  of 
capital..." (1964  [1936],  p.174j.  Keynes  could  then  separate  the 
analysis  of  the  behavior  of  liquidity  preference  from  that  of 
expected  profitability.  This  was  undoubtedly  an  advance,  but  it 
contributed  to  forgetting  the  possibility  of  some  connection 
between  the two. 
Keynes's  discussion  of the.relation..of  liquidity  preference 
to  the  rate  of  interest  thus  came  to  focus  on  his  speculative 
motive  to be  liquid.  Keynes  (1964  [1936], pp.  201-204)  and  some 
of his  interpreters  (e.g., Kaldor,  1939; Axe1  Leijonhufvud,  1968) 
have  spoken  of  the  long-term  interest  rate  as  being  primarily 
determined  by the views  of financial market  speculators  concerning 
the llnormaltl  or llsafel#  rate, as in accordance  with the expectations 
theory  of the term  structure.  On this view,  liquidity  preference 
tethers  the  long-term  rate  due  to  speculative  activity  enough  to 
keep  it  from  moving  sufficiently  to  offset  fluctuations  in 
investment  spending.  That  is, should  investment  fall, the drop  in 
the  demand  to borrow  will  not cause  a drop  in long-term  interest 
rates  large  enough  to revive  investment  spending  (or consumption 
spending  in some of these interpretations)  because  speculators  will 
sell  bonds  on any  significant  rise  in prices  in expectation  of a 





in the near-enough  future. 
existence  of  a liquidity  premium  in the  term  structure, 
requires  concern with Keynes's precautionarv  motive  to be 
Tobin  (1958) showed  that  fear of capital  losses--capital ,  7 
risk  aversion  --was  an aspect  of  liquidity  preference  which  was  a 
function  not  only  of  income,  as  Keynes  had  it,  but  also  of  the 
level of interest  rates relative  to expected.  This  idea is really 
a union  of speculative  and precautionary  concerns.  Investors  who 
are capital  risk averse  will be concerned  with  expectations  about 
future  movements  in  rates,  and  fear  of  unfavorable  movements  in 
rates  will  lead them  to demand  a premium  for bearing  the  risk  of 
betting  on  their  expectations.  Concern  for  both  the  m&an  and  \ 
variance  of the distribution  of interest  rates will thus cause the 
term  structure  to  exhibit  expectations  biased  upwards  of  future 
movements  in rates. 
The  idea  that  Shiller,  Campbell,  and  Shoenholtz  and  Mankiw 
were  working  on  then  regarding  the  variability  of  the  liquidity 
premium  was that changes  in the variance  of the distribution  might 
lead to changes  in the liquidity  premium.  As mentioned,  however, 
their  efforts  have  been  unsuccessful.  The  idea  that  Mott, 
following  Keynes  and  Robinson,  proposed  was  that  changes  in  the 
profitability  of investment  rather than changes  in the volatility 
of  interest  rates  might  be  the  cause  of  variability  in  the 
liquidity  premium.  Concerns  regarding  profitability,  though, 
properly  are dealt  with  under  the domain  of default  risk on risky 
securities.  Liquidity  concerns  have  to do not with  the  question 
of the realization  of the payments  due on securities  but with  the 
value  of securities  if cashed  prior  to maturity.  Though  changes 
in default  risk would  affect  this value,  it would  also be changed 
solely by market  interest rate movements even for default-risk-free securities, 
concern  for 
such  as U.S.  government 
the profitability  of the 
8 
bonds,  on  which  there  is no 
issuing  agent. 
Profitability  in  the  aggregate,  however,  might  affect  the 
degree  to which  investors  are  concerned  for  liquidity.  In other 
words,  the  concern  for  interest  rate  movements  which  may  affect 
adversely  the current value of one's portfolio  may itself vary over 
time  as the  economic  environment_.as..a  whole  becomes  more  or  less 
risky.  A simple and straightforward  way this might  occur would  be 
for  inv.estors who  are  selling  risky  bonds  and  stocks  because  of 
concern  over default  risk at a time when  profit  expectations  have 
fallen to hold  the cash they have thus  freed up in Treasury  bills 
rather than in less risky corporate securities  or default-risk-free 
but  long-term  and so less liquid Treasury  bonds. 
Keynes  must  have  thought  liquidity  preference  to  be  related. 
to profitability  in some such fashion,  for he wrote  in his General 
Theory  chapter  on the trade cycle  (Chap. 22), "Moreover,  the dismay 
and uncertainty  as to the  future  which  accompanies  a collapse  in 
the marginal  efficiency  of capital  naturally  precipitates  a sharp 
increase  in liquidity-preference --and hence  a rise  in the rate of 
interest"  (Keynes,  1964  [1936],  p.  316).  Not  much  empirical 
evidence  has been brought  to bear as yet on this matter.  One such 
piece, though,  is Peter Ternin's  (1976, pp. 103-121) suggestion  that 
the liquidity  premium  on long-term U.S. government  securities  rose 
in the early  1930s during  the Great  Depression.  Another  is found 
in the work  of Charles  Nelson  (1972, Chap.  6), who  regressed  his 
estimates  of the  liquidity  premium  against  the  level  of  interest 9 
rates and an index of business confidence.  He found the liquidity 
premium to be related negatively to both.'  Other researchers, such 
as James Pesando (1975)  and Benjamin Friedman (1979),  however, have 
failed  to  find  any  significant  relationship  between  "economic 
activity" variables and the liquidity premium.  4  Finally, Eugene 
Fama (1986) found that expected liquidity premia on Treasury bills 
and  on  private  securities vary  with  the  business  cycle  across 
maturities of each type of security in a way that finds them an 
increasing function of maturity in good business conditions but a 




3Does the  work  mentioned  earlier  on  the  relation  of  the 
liquidity premium to the level of interest rates shed any light on 
the  relation  of  the  liquidity  premium  to  profitability? 
Profitability generally is highest cyclically when interest rates 
are highest, though this is more true for short rates than long 
rates.  The cyclical peak for both short and long rates normally 
occurs after the peak in profitability, and the peak for long rates 
is usually  later than  the  peak  in short  rates.  The  argument 
advanced by partisans of the idea that the liquidity premium should 
be negatively related to the level of rates has been on speculative 
or  expectational  grounds:  the  greater  the  deviation  from  the 
llnormalll  rate, the greater the chance that rates will move towards 
the normal rate. (See,  for example,  Malkiel, 1966, Chap. 3.)  Those 
arguing for a positive relation between the liquidity premium and 
the level of rates say that the opportunity cost of holding tlmoneytU 
(presumably  currency plus bank deposits paying no interest or with 
interest ceilings) rises when rates rise, leading people to move 
from money to short-term securities.  And, indeed, the work done 
confirming the positive relationship  has all been with very short- 
term securities. 
4We should note that Friedman did find a significant relation 
between  several  of  his  economic  activity  variables  and  the 
liquidity premium but that this relation failed to obtain when the 
level  of  interest  rates,  which  of  course  moves  with  economic 
activity as described in footnote 3, was added to the regression. 10 
Our  study  of the empirical  relation  of the  liquidity  premium 
to  profitability  involves  two  projects.  First,  'we estimate  a 
"traditional"  or  tlold-fashionedfi'  sort  of  equation  for  the  term 
structure,  which  takes  the  long-term  rate  to  be  a  function  of  a 
distributed  lag  of  short-term  rates.  This  assumes  that,  since 
under  the expectations  hypothesis  the long rate  is an expectation 
of the future short rate, there is a forecast of future short rates 
in the recent movements  of short rates.  This type of specification 
is found  in the  large-scale  macroeconometric  models. 
We  estimated  a rather  simple  form of such  an equation  taken 
from Mankiw  (1986).  This  equation  is 
(1)  R, - r, = a0 + al(r,  - r,_,)  + az(r,_, 
+ a3  (R,-l  - rt-l)  + Et, . 
-  rt-2  1 
where  R = long rate,  r = short  rate, and  E = a random  error  term. 
Under  such a specification  the constant  term, a,, is the  liquidity 
premium,  or amount  by which  the long rate exceeds  the expectation 
of the  future  short  rate due to liquidity  concerns.  Variation  in 
the  liquidity  premium  may  be  found  then  in the  residuals  of  the 
equation,  assuming  that the differences  between  the actual  values 
of the dependent  variable  and the fitted values  from the regression 
also reflect,  in large enough  measure,  liquidity  concerns. 
Because  such  a  specification  might  seem  to  be  overly 
simplistic,  even on the grounds  of the older way of looking  at the 
issue,  and  in  order  additionally  to  offer  an  alternative 11 
specification  within  that  framework,  we  also  looked  at  the  old 
Modigliani  and Sutch  (1966) term structure  equation  as a method  of 
exploring  variation  in the  liquidity  premium.  The  advantage  of 
this  specification  is  that  it  allows  for  a  more  complex  lag 
structure.  Modigliani  and  Sutch  argued  that  the  information 
contained  in past  interest  rates  should  have both  a regressive  as 
well as extrapolative  nature.  This would imply an inverted U-shape 
for  the  weights  on  the  lagged  rates.  Modigliani  an&$ Sutch 
concluded  that using the Almon Lag technique  to estimate  a fourth- 
degree  polynomial  would  give  sufficient  flexibility  to  reproduce 
closely  the true  lag structure. 
The equation  we estimated  for this  specification  then was 
(2)  Rt  =  %  +  qrt  +  &Pirt-i  +  Et, 
_ 
where  again  a, is the  liquidity  premium  and  the  residuals  of the 
equation  are taken  as its variations  over time. 
The problems  of these  18traditionalt specifications  of course 
is that  they  do not  take  into account  any  information  other  than 
past  movements  in interest rates.  Even with this weakness,  though, 
it would  be interesting  to note if the historical  relation  between 
long-term and short-term  rates identified by these  equations  showed 
a systematic  deviation  which  was  correlated  with  our  measures  of 
profitability  and liquidity  concerns.  In addition,  the  "forward- 
lookingfil  specification  to  which  we  are  about  to  turn,  with  its 12 
assumptions  of  an  efficient market  and  investors with  rational 
expectations, is not problem-free, either. 
Still, assuming the market to be efficient, holding period 
yields on  long-term securities should not systematically exceed 
those on short-terms except as an allowance for risk aversion.  As 
an hypothesis, this can serve as a test of rational expectations 
in the  term  structure.  Mankiw  (1986, PP.  74-81)  subjects  the 
theory to such a test by, among other things, regressing‘excess 
holding  period  returns  on  long-term government  securities  over 
short-terms against the spread between long and short rates.  He 
finds that the spread is significantly correlated with the excess 
holding period return.  In a separate test he regresses the change 
in  the  long  rate  on  the  spread  and  finds  that  the  spread  l 
successfully predicts changes in the long rate, another violation 
of market efficiency. 
Mankiw  (1986,  pp. 81-91) thus suggests that the spread could 
be  correlated with  excess holding period  returns because  it is 
proxying for the risk of holding long-term securities (the degree 
of  liquidity  preference). 
estimation of the following 
He  says  that  in  such  an  event  an 
equation, 
(3)  H,  - rt  = a + fl(&  -  r,)  +  7  (RISK,)  +  et, 
where H = the holding period return on long-term securities, should 
show /3  insignificantly different from zero. 13 
Mankiw,  however,  does  not  run  such  a regression,  but  rather 
regresses  his  candidates  for  RISK  against  the  spread.  This  is 
because,  as  he  says,  for RISK  to  drive  the  significance  of p  to 
zero  in  equation  (3)  RISK  and  the  spread  (R, -  r,)  must  be 
positively  correlated.  From our point  of view,  though,  we do want 
to estimate  equation  (3), and we give the following  two reasons  or 
justifications.  First, if we were to regress the variables  we want 
to test  as  representing  RISK  against  the  spread,  no  one wc?uld  be 
surprised  at  their  success  because  many  of  them  display  a 
pronounced  correlation  with the business  cycle as does the spread. 
Second,  we believe  that  there may well  be a reason  for the spread 
properly  to be a significant  predictor  of the excess holding  period 
.return.  In a way, all we are saying  is that the spread  is perhaps 
a proper  proxy  for RISK,.  but  it may  be  a type  of  risk  different 
from the risk we are attempting  to measure.  After  all, the major 
risk concern  investors have when buying long-term securities  is the 
risk of receiving  a capital  loss.  Our concern  is more exactly  not 
the  changes  in this  risk  but  rather  the  changes  in consideration 
for this risk.  Another  way of putting  it is to say that we are not 
concerned  with movements  alonq a liquidity preference  schedule  but 
with movements  ,of  the schedule  as a whole.  The level of the spread 
is indeed a proper proxy for movements  along a liquidity preference 
schedule  insofar  as  it serves  as  the  expectation  of  future  rate 
movements.  To  the  extent  that  there  are  transactions  costs  and 
uncertainty  the  spread  should  rationally  forecast  excess  holding 
period  returns  on long-term  securities  because  to the extent  that 14 
there  are  mean-reverting  tendencies  in  interest  rates  the  higher 
the spread  is the greater  the risk of a capital  loss on long-term 
securities. 5  This is really nothing but a restatement  of the logic 
of the expectations  theory of the term structure  or the speculative 
demand  for  liquidity.  Volatility  measures  as  measures  of  time- 
varying  risk,  as Mankiw  uses,  are getting  at  similar  information 
to that given  by the spread.  Our measures  are attempts  to get at 
a different  kind  of information.  \ 
Our  measures  of  factors  affecting  the  degree  of  liquidity 
preference  or  capital  risk  aversion  can  be  grouped  into  three 
categories.  First,  we  have  a  list  of  variables  that  serve  as 
measures  of actual  or expected  profitability.  These  are capacity 
utilization  (IPXCA),  real  cash  flow  divided  by  capacity  (GCFZ), 
real profits divided by capacity  (GPATZ), a composite  profitability 
index,  compiled  by  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  for  Business 
Conditions  Diaest, divided  by capacity  (DLEAPZ), real stock prices 
divided by capacity  (RSPZ), and since we were appealing  to Keynes's 
idea of a sympathetic  response  of liquidity  preference  to changes 
in  investment  spending,  real  gross  private  nonresidential 
investment  divided  by  capacity  (GIN8Z).  Capacity  (Z), which  is 
arrived  at  by  dividing  industrial  production  (Y)  by  capacity 
utilization  (Y/Z)  in  a  reverse  engineering  of  how  the  Federal 
Reserve  makes  its  estimate  of  capacity  utilization,  is  in  the 
5For  a  recent  discussion  of  mean-reverting  tendencies  in 
interest rates as an explanation  of the forecast power  in long-term 
forward  rates  see Fama and Robert  Bliss  (1987). 15 
denominator  of all  these  variables  to take  care  of the  fact that 
they grow  over time with  the economy  in a way that  interest  rates 
and liquidity  premia do not.  Capacity  seemed to be the right thing 
to  take  care  of  this,  since  it  is a measure  of  the  value  of  the 
assets  of  business  which  does  not  suffer  from  the  excess 
variability  of capital  market  valuations  or  from  the  problems  in 
valuing  capital  raised  in the Cambridge  capital  controversy,  as it 
is defined  in terms  of how much output  it can create.  True,,.  there 
may  be  problems  with  the  Fed's  measurements,  but  there  are 
hopefully  of  small  order,  and 
generate  with  available  data. 
deflator. 
the  variable  is certainly  easy  to 
The price  deflator  used  is the GNP 
The next  set of variables  are those which  measure  the-burden 
of outstanding  debt to business.  The measures  of this burden which 
we constructed  are the ratio of net  interest  to cash  flow  (BURD), 
the ratio of net interest  to profits  (GJAT), the outstanding  stock 
of debt, which  we created  by dividing  net  interest  by an interest 
rate, divided  by capacity  (DEBTZ), and real current  liabilities  of 
business  failures  divided  by capacity  (FAILZ).6 
Finally,  variables  which  we  thought  would  capture  overall 
business  risk  and  profitability  conditions  are  the  default  risk 
6  Because  the  failure  rate  is so high  for new businesses,  it 
has  been  argued  that  current  liabilities  of  business  failures 
mainly  reflects  the  number  of  start-ups  rather  than  the  overall 
troubles  of business.  On the other  hand,  Friedman  (1986, p.  46) 
notes  that  this  statistic  (scaled  in  relation  to  gross  national 
product  in his study) tends to bulge around and just after business 
cycle  troughs. 16 
premium  given  by  the  difference  between  Moody's  BAA  and  AAA 
corporate  rates  (DRP), suggested  by Alan  Blinder  in the  comments 
on Mankiw  and 
which took on 
peak  through 
peak. 
Summers  (1984, p. 246), and a dummy variable,  CONTRQ, 
the value of one in every quarter  from business  cycle 
trough  and zero  in every  quarter  from trough  through 
The danger  in using  so many variables  as possible  proxies  for 
business  difficulties  of course  is that the estimation  cank3,easily 
become  an exercise  in data mining.  Mankiw  (1986, p. 75) points  out 
that in attempts  to explain the liquidity premium‘or  excess holding 
period  yields,  enough  attempts  will  eventually  succeed  in finding 
something  that works,  and so the c-statistics  should  be discounted 
by  the  number  of  unsuccessful  attempts.  One  obviously  wants  to 
limit  one's  choices  of  variables  in  accordance  with  the  theory 
being  explored.  We feel we have been careful  to do that,  but even 
so there  are  a number  of candidate  variables  we  can  use.  Rather 
than just to take a few, and perhaps  then to be capriciously  lucky 
or  unlucky,  we  felt  it  was  best  to  take  more  and  then  demand 
robustness  across  them  in the trials. 
Our method  of estimation  then proceeded  as follows.  For the 
traditional  equations  (1) and  (2) of course the residuals  from each 
equation  were  the  dependent  variables.  First,  we  regressed  each 
set  of  residuals  against  a  constant  and  the  profitability,  debt 
burden,  and general  business  risk variables  one at a time.  Then, 
we  regressed  each  set  of  residuals  against  a  constant  and  every 17 
combination  of  a  profitability  and  debt  burden  variable,  on  the 
grounds  that  there  could  well  be  separate  influences  from  both 
profitability  and debt burden  concerns  that would  call  for such a 
multiple  regression. 
The  next  step  was  to add  to  the  right  hand  side  of  each  of 
these two regressions  various  other sets of variables  representing 
other possible  influences  on the term  structure  that might  either 
have effects that our hypothesized  variables  are mistakenly  p,icking 
up or add  information  necessary  to reveal  the significance  of our 
variables.  Our first such set included PIPQ, the percentage  change 
in  industrial  production,  as  a measure  of  information  about  the 
stage  of  the  business  cycle,  PSMCQ,  the  change  in  sensitive 
materials  prices,  to signal  inflationary  warnings7,  and INFLA, the 
percentage  change  in the GNP deflator,  to give of course the actual 
rate of inflation.  The  second  set was -only  one of two variables, 
MSTD8S,  an eight-quarter  moving  standard  deviation  of the  short- 
term  rate,  or MSTD8L,  an eight-quarter  moving  standard  deviation 
of the long-term  rate.  These  are ad hoc measures  of interest-rate 
volatility  used heretofore  in the literature.  (See, e.g., Shiller, 
Campbell,  and Schoenholtz,  1983, p. 199.)  The third set was either 
the  long-rate  (FYGLZQ --the  quarterly  unweighted  average  of  all 
Treasury  bonds neither  due nor callable  in less than ten years)  or 
the short-rate  (FYGN3Q  --the quarterly  average of the discount  rate 
on new  issues  of three-month  Treasury  bills)  itself,  as a test of 
7This variable  is also used  sometimes  as a leading  indicator 
for the cycle. 18 
the  significance  of the height  of  interest  rates.  This  test  was 
especially  important  for us because  of  Friedman's  (1979)  finding 
that the success  of economic  variables  in his  regressions  on term 
premia  on six-month  T-bills  derived  from expectations  surveys  was 
completely  explained  away  by the  cyclical  movement  in the  height 
of interest  rates. 
For  equation  (3)  we  ran. essentially  the  same  regressions 
except  that  the  excess  holding  period  yield  (H,.  -  r,) Gas  the 
dependent  variable  and SPREAD  (= R, - r,) was  always  on the  right 
hand  side  for reasons  given  above.  Thus we are just  substituting 
our  variables  for  RISK  in the  equation.  Ht, the  holding-period 
return,  is  given,  following  Mankiw  and  others,  by  a  linearized 
expression,  R, - 100(R,+l  - R,)/p, where p is a constant  equaling  the 
average  long-term  rate. 
The interest  rates used  for long and short rates respectively 
are FYGL2Q and FYGN3Q explained  above.  All of our data comes  from 
the Citibase  tape.  Since  some of our series  are only available  on 
a  quarterly  basis,  we  were  forced  to  use  or  derive  quarterly 
observations  throughout.  Our data covers the period  from the first 
quarter  of  1950  to  the  fourth  quarter  of  1986.  Though  some 
regressions  had  to miss  observations  on either  end  of the  sample 
due to generating  lags and leads,  no regression  covered  a smaller 
range  than  1953:3  to 1986:l. 
Results 
The  results  from  the  "traditional" 
disappointing.  None  of  our  variables  were 
specifications  were 
significant  when  the 19 
residuals  from equation  (1) or equation  (2) was  regressed  on each 
plus  a  constant.  In  the  multiple  regressions  combining  the 
profitability  and debt burden  variables  some of the profitability 
variables  were  significant  with  the right  sign but as many  of the 
debt  burden  variables  were  significant  with  the  wrong  sign  in 
enough of the same equations  that we don't see much support  for our 
hypothesis  there.  Some  of  the  profitability  and  debt  burden 
variables  are highly  (negatively)  correlated  with  each other,  and 
many  of  them  are  also  highly  correlated  with  both  the  standard 
deviations  of interest rates and the level of interest  rates, which 
we are using as checks on the significance  of the explanatory  power 
of our hypothesis.  Thus we don't  feel that the slight  success  we 
get  with  some  of  the  profitability  variables  in  some  of  the 
multiple  regressions  is worth  reporting. 
Given the criticisms  that have been-leveled  against the method 
of expectations  formation  in those specifications,  this may not be 
too  troubling.  Equation  (3)  is  more  consistent  with  economic 
theory,  at  least  since  the  rational  expectations  revolution,  yet 
its  underlying  motivation--that  agents  do  not  make  systematic 
errors,  or  that  the  market  is  not  systematically  wrong,  and  so 
extra  return  over time can only be a compensation  for extra  risk- 
-has  its own problems,  which  we touch  on below. 
In  any  event,  the  results  from  the  estimations  of  equation 
(3), at least with the debt burden variables  substituting  for RISK 
in the equation,  are quite  favorable  for our hypothesis.  GJAT and 
FAILZ  are always  significantly  different  from zero with  the right sign  (a positive  sign,  since  they  should  increase  the 
lending  long-term  according  to  our  argument),  and  BURD 
20 
risk  of 
is  often 
significant  with  the right  sign.  DEBTZ  is never  significant,  but 
one might  argue that the other three variables  are better  measures 
of the burden  of debt,  since  they  relate  directly  to the  ability 
to cover  current  debt payments. 
The  favorable  results  for.GJAT  and FAILZ  (which are reported 
in the Appendix,  along with the results  for BURD) obtain  no-,matter 
which  of  the  other  variables 
inflation,  volatility,  or  level 
with them  in a regression.  Some 
, 
(profitability,  cycle  stage  and 
of  interest  rates)  are  included 
of these  other variables  are also 
sometimes  significant,  though  there  seem  to  be  some  oddities  in 
some of their signs.  For example, the volatility  variables  (MSTD8S 
and  MSTD8L)  sometimes  are  significant  with  negative  signs, 
indicating  volatility  to be compensated  by a lower  excess  holding 
period  yield  on  long-term  securities.  PSMCQ,  the  change  in 
sensitive  materials  prices  is  also  sometimes  significant  with  a 
negative  sign.  If PSMCQ  is taken  as an inflation  warning  signal, 
this would be odd.  If, however,  it serves more  as an indicator  of 
an  increase  in  business  activity,  the  negative  sign  would  be 
correct.  The  long-  and  short-term  interest  rates,  when 
significant,  switch  signs.  They  have  negative  coefficients  when 
they  are  significant  and  neither  volatility  variable  is  in  the 
regression  and positive when otherwise significant.  Since they are 
highly  correlated  with  the  volatility  variables,  this  switch  is 
perhaps  not surprising. 21 
The profitability  variables  are never significant  unless there 
is also  a debt burden  variable  in the regression.  Even then,  the 
profitability  variables  are rarely significant.  In the few trials 
in which one of them is significant,  it usually  has the wrong  sign. 
In fact, the only profitability  variable  which  is ever significant 
with  the  right  sign  (negative,  since  higher  profitability  should 
decrease  the risk of long-term  lending  on our argument)  is GCFZ  in 
some of the regressions  with  FAILZ.  \ 
Conclusions 
We  conclude  then  that,  to  the  extent  that  excess  holding 
period  yields  on  long-term  securities  can  be  said  to  be 
compensation  for the risk of lending long-term,  our conjecture 
levels  of profitability  and debt burden  of firms affect  such 
is borne  out by the data, at least insofar  as the debt burden 





government  securities  liquidity preference,  or movement  towards  the 
shorter  end of the market,  is exhibited  when  debt burdens  rise  in 
the aggregate. 
In  terms  of  Keynes's 
responding  to  movements  of 
ideas  about  liquidity  preference 
the  marginal  efficiency  of  capital 
schedule we have not found a general version  of such a response but 
only a somewhat more specific response to debt burden ratios.  This 
would  support  an interpreter  of Keynes such as Hyman Minsky  (1975, 
1977), who would  reinterpret  Keynes  to place more  emphasis  on the 
systematic  build  up  of  "financial  fragility"  in expansions  which 
sows  the  seeds  for  subsequent  downturns.  The  results  of  our 22 
estimations  seem  to  be  telling  us  that  such  increases  in  debt 
burdens  elicit  a  reaction  in  the  bond  market  which  raises  the 
required  yield  on  long-term  lending.  This  would  also  impede  the 
ability  of monetary  policy  to ameliorate  the situation,  since  the 
central  bank can increase  the availability  of funds but may not be 
able to get those  funds into the long-term  end of the market,  which 
is presumably  the  important  area to influence  business  investment 
spending.8  \ 
, 
Of course  we have  only  explained  at best  28 per  cent  of the 
variance  in excess  holding  period  yields.  The  idea that  there  is 
a lot else  going  on  in financial  markets  would  not  be  strange  to 
Keynes.  But  once  we  open  ourselves  to  the  idea  that  financial 
markets  may  not be very  efficient  with  respect  to information,  we 
also  raise  the question  of why  our results  should  be believable.' 
We claim  that  the bond market  rationally  anticipates  our measures 
of debt burden,  but we know that it does not rationally  anticipate 
inflation  (See,  e.g.,  Summers,  1983.),  and  our  results  support 
this.  In defense  of our results,  it may be that debt  burdens  and 
their  effects  on  bonds  are  much  easier  to  observe  or  infer  than 
inflation  and  its effects. 
8This was  the major  problem  Keynes  was  concerned 
discussion  surrounding  the idea of a "liquidity  trap." 
(1964  [1936], pp.  205-208). 
with  in his 
See Keynes 
'For evidence  questioning  the efficiency  of financial  markets 
see  a  number  of  papers  by  Shiller,  summarized  very  nicely  in 
Shiller  (1986).  Fama  (1984) also  notes  how  hard  it  is to  infer 
much  about  term  premia  on  bonds  due  to  the  high  variability  of 
their  returns. 23 
Finally,  we should  note that our concerns  about  the  relation 
between  profitability,  broadly  defined,  and  interest  rates  really 
have to do of course with corporate  borrowing.  There the pertinent 
interest  rates  are  corporate  rates.  A  study  of  time-varying 
liquidity  preference  in  the  Treasury  yield  curve  is  relevant  to 
this  concern  and  interesting 
represents  taking the strongest 
in  its  own 
case, where it 
right.  It  really 
is least likely that 
the  phenomenon  will  be  observed,  to  test  the  hypothesi?  t.hat 
profitability  concerns  affect  default-risk-free  government 
securities.  The  logical  extension  then  is to look  for a response 
of  liquidity  preference  to changes  in profitability  in corporate 
interest rates.  The cyclical behavior of default  risk, as measured 
for example  by the  spread  between  the  BAA  and AAA  rate,  has  been 
studied.  (See, e.g., Dwight  Jaffee,  1975.)  Since economic  troubles 
may  likely  cause  defaults  on  short-term  debt  before  long-te_rm, 
there  may  be  little  cyclical  movement  from  long-  to  short-dated 
corporate  securities  in  response  to  bad  economic  conditions.l' 
Therefore,  particularly  if one is concerned  with  the  issue of the 
transmission  of monetary  policy,  an  interesting  idea might  be to 
take  a Treasury  bill  rate,  which  presumably  the  Fed  can  control, 
"Fama  (1986)  finds  that  expected  default  premia  across 
private  securities  in the short end of the market  actually  decline 
with  maturity  and  increase  in  recessions  more  on  shorter-term 
securities.  Thus on average he finds no term premium  on his sample 
of  private  securities.  A  discussion  of  earlier  studies  of  the 
relationship  between  the risk structure  and the term  structure  of 
interest  rates which  explains  this sort of phenomenon  and extends 
the analysis  of the issues involved appears  in Van Horne  (1978, pp. 
164-172.) 24 
as the  short  rate  and  alternately  the corporate  AAA  and  BAA rate 
as.  the  long  rate  in  a  study  of  the  effect  of  profitability  on 
liquidity  preference  like this  one.ll 
. 
'IRobert  Engle,  David  Lilien,  and  Russell  Robins  (1987) 
attempt  to explain  the time-varying  liquidity  premium  on both  the 
Treasury  yield  curve  and  AAA  bonds  relative  to  the  T-bill  rate 
using  the  ARCH-M  model,  which  allows  the  conditional  variance  to 
be  a  determinant  of  the  expectation  of  excess  holding  period 
yields.  It  would  be  interesting  to  see  if  our  debt  burden 
variables  could  outperform  this  ARCH-generated  conditional 
variance. 25 
APPENDIX 
C  SPREAD  FAIL2  PIPQ  PSMCQ  INFLA  MSTD8S  MSTD8L  FYGL2Q  FYGN3Q  it2  D.W. 
-4.34  1.54  0.69  .  24  1.79 
(-4.54)(2.79)(3.62) 
-2.87  1.57  0.61  -0.27  -0.83  -0.62  .  26  1.96 
(-1.98)(2.54)(3.11)(-l.Ol)(-1.23)(-0.72) 
-3.23  1.24  0.80  -1.  5.4  .  25  1.81 
(-2.69)(2.13)(3.94)  (-1.53) 
-3.76  1.12  0.92  -3.29  \  .  26  1.86 
(-3.74)(1.88)(4.01)  (-1.77)  \ 
-2.94  1.20  0.92  -0.35  .  25  1.82 
(-2.18)(2.01)(3.75)  (-1.47) 
-2.94  0.84  0.92  -0.35  .  25  1.84 
(-2.18)(1.16)(3.75)  (-1.45) 
-2.60  1.46  0.69  -0.29  -0.69  -0.15.  -1.23  .  26  1.96 
(-1.77)(2.33)(3.28)(-l.ll)(-1.06)(-0.16)(-1.07) 
-3.05  1.34  0.83  -0.29  -0.83  0.02  -3.34  .  27  2.01 
(-2.11)(2.14)(3.52)(-l.ll)(-1.30)  (0.02)  _  (-1.64) 
-2.48  1.46  0.83  -0.30  -0.76  0.18  -0.35  .  26  2.00. 
(-1.66)(2.35)(3.02)(-l.ll)(-1.17)  (0.16)  (-1.12) 
-2.48  1.11  0.83  -0.30  -0.76  0.18  -0.35  .  26  2.00 
(-1.66)(1.50)(3.02)(-l.ll)(-1.17)  (0.16)  (-1.12) 
-2.93  1.18  0.88  -0.99  -0.18  .  25  1.83 
(-2.16)(1.97)(3.44)  1  (-0.64)  (-0.48) 
-2.93  1.01  0.88  -0.99  -0.18  .  25  1.83 
(-2.16)(1.31)(3.44)  (-0.64)  (-0.48) 
-3.70  1.12  0.93  -3.17  -0.02  .25  1.84 
(-2.37)(1.86)(3.79)  (-0.98)(-0.05) 
-3.70  1.10  0.93  -3.17  -0.02  .  25  1.84 
(-2.37)(1.42)(3.79)  (-0.98)  (-0.05) 
-2.47  1.44  0.80  -0.30  -0.71  0.16  -0.67  -0.23  25  1.99 
(-1.65)(2.30)(2.85)(-1.13)(-1.08)  (0.14)(-0.43)  (-0.55)  * 
-2.47  1.21  0.80  -0.30  -0.71  0.16  -0.67  -0.23  .  25  1.99 
(-1.65)(1.56)(2.85)(-1.13)(-1.08)  (0.14)(-0.43)  (-0.55) 26 
C  SPREAD  FAIL2  PIPQ  PSMCQ  INFLA  MSTD8S  MSTD8L  FYGL2Q  FYGN3Q  i?  D.W. 
-3.27  1.33  0.79  -0.29  -0.86  -0.18  -4.13  0.15  .  26  2.00 
(-2.02)(2.12)(2.90)(-1.07)(-1.33)(-0.16)  (-1.23)  (0.30) 
-3.27  1.49  0.79  -0.29  -0.86  -0.18  -4.13  0.15  .26  2.00 
(-2.02)(1.87)(2.90)(-1.07)(-1.33)(-0.16)  (-1.23)  (0.30) 
C  SPREAD  GJAT  PIPQ  PSMCQ  INFLA  MSTD8S  MSTD8L  FYGL2Q  FYGN3Q  8'  D.W. 
-3.84  2.32  6.41  .  21  1.77 
(-3.71)(4.71)(2.56) 
-1.79  1..  86  7.97  -0.12  -1.17  -1.67  .  25  2.00 
(-1.32)(3.12)(2.76)(-0.45)(-1.85)(-1.67) 
-2.19  1.59  14.4  -4.24  .  .  26  1.87 
(-1.93)(2.98)(4.05)  (-3.08)  \ 
-3.64  1.77  15.4  -6.98  .  24  1.88 
(-3.59)(3.37)(3.66)  (-2.63) 
-1.07  1.79  18.3  -1.04 
.. 
24  1.95 
(-0.72)(3.40)(3.47)  (-2.55) 
-1.07  0.75  18.3  -1.04  .  24  1.95 
(-0.72)(0.96)(3.47)  (-2.55) 
-0.97  1.38  13.8  -0.09  -0.90  -1.32  -3.26  .  27  2.03 
(-0.70)(2.24)(3.61)(-0.35)(-1.42)(-1.33)(-2.2_8) 
-1.68  1.23  17.7  0.00  -1.39  -1.68  -7.42  .  28  2.16 
(-1.27)(2.00)(3.98)  (O.OO)(-2.24)(-1.73)  (-2.83) 
-0.23  1.59  16.8  -0.03  -1.24  -1.07  -0.82  .  26  2.13 
(-0.15)(2.66)(3.10)(-O.lO)(-1.98)(-1.03)  (-1.92) 
-0.23  0.77  16.8  -0.03  -1.24  -1.07  -0.82  .  26  2.13 
(-0.15)(0.95)(3.10)(-O.lO)(-1.03)  (-1.92) 
-0.75  1.40  20.4  -3.38  -0.66 
(-0.51)(2.56)(3.87)  (-2.29)  (-1.53)  * 
26  1.97 
-0.75  0.73  20.4  -3.38  -0.66  .  26  1.97 
(-0.51)(0.95)(3.87)  (-2.29)  (-1.53) 
-2.04  1.64  19.5  -4.58  -0.62  25  1.95 
(-1.25)(3.07)(3.65)  (-1.39)(-1.24)  * 
-2.04  1.02  19.5  -4.58  -0.62  .  25  1.95 
(-1.25)(1.27)(3.65)  (-1.39)  (-1.24) 
-0.08  1.30  18.6  -0.03  -1.00  -0.98  -2.62  -0.56  27  2.11 
(-0.05)(2.11)(3.40)(-0.13)(-1.57)(-0.95)(-1.72)  (-1.22)  l 27 
C  SPREAD  GJAT  PIPQ  PSMCQ  INFLA  MSTD8S  MSTD8L  FYGL2Q  FYGN3Q  R2  D.W. 
-0.08  0.75  18.6  -0.03  -1.00  -0.98  -2.62  -0.56  .  27  2.11 
(-0.05)(0.93)(3.40)(-0.13)(-1.57)(-O-95)(-1.72)  (-1.22) 
-1.42  1.23  18.5  0.01  -1.39  -1.57  -6.88  -0.14  28  2.17 
(-0._86)(2.00)(3.42)  (0.03)(-2.23)(-1.50)  (-2.06)(-0.26)  ' 
-1.42  1.09  18.5  0.01  -1.39  -1.57  -6.88  -0.14  .  28  2.17 
(-0.86)(1.34)(3.42)  (0.03)(-2.23)(-1.50)  (-2.06)  (-0.26) 
C  SPREAD  BURD  PIPQ  PSMCQ  INFLA  MSTD8S  MSTD8L  FYkL2Q  FYGN3Q  it2  D.W. 
-3.82  2.59  1427  .  18  1.73 
(-2.68)(5.34)(1.58) 
-2.42  2.19  2255  -0.15  -1.26  -1.65  \  .  23  1.97 
(-1.58)(3.84)(1.97)(-0.52)(-1.98)(-1.48) 
-3.69  2.33  3340  -2.84  .  20  1.77 
(-2.62)(4.66)(2.54)  (-1.98) 
-4.23  2.53  2496  -2.49  .  18  1.75 
(-2.85)(5.17)(1.78)  (-0.99) 
-3.64  2.58  2925  -0.36  18  1.77 
(-2.51)(5.30)(1.40)  (-0.79)  l 
-3.64  2.21  2925  -0.36  .  18  1.77 
(-2.51)(3.27)(1.40)  (-0.79) 
-2.41  1.99  3711  -0.12  -1.13  -1.65  -2.13  .  23  1.98 
(-1.59)(3.40)(2.46)(-0.42)(-1.75)(-1.48)(-1.48) 
-3.01  2.02  4091  -0.07  -1.43  -1.90  -3.82  .  23  2.03 
(-1.92)(3.48)(2.47)(-0.26)(-2.22)(-1.70)  (-1.53) 
-2.31  2.17  3700  -0.09  -1.32  -1.64  -0.34  .  22  2.01 
(-1.50)(3.79)(1.64)(-0.33)(-2.06)(-1.47)  (-0.74) 
-2.31  1.83  3700  -0.09  -1.32  -1.64  -0.34  *  22  2.01 
(-1.501(2.43)(1.64)(-0.33)(-2.06)(-1.47)  (-0.74) 
-3.67  2.33  3511 
(-2.56)(4.64)(1.67) 
-3.67  2.29  3511 
(-2.56)(3.38)(1.67) 
-4.12  2.54  2747 
(-2.50)(5.15)(1.29) 
-4.12  2.44  2747 
(-2.50)(3.17)(1.29) 
-2.79  -0.05 
(-1.81)  (-0.10) 
-2.79 
(-1.81) 




. 22  1.77 
-0.05  .22  1.77 
(-0.10) 
. 18  1.76 
-0.10  .  18  1.76 
(-0.16) C  SPREAD  BURD  PIPQ  PSMCQ  INFLA  MSTD8S  MSTD8L  FYGLZQ  FYGN3Q  i?  D.W. 
-2.38  1.99  4096  -0.10  -1.16  -1.65  -2.00  -0.11  - 23  2.00 
(-1.55)(3.39)(1.80  )(-0.35 )(-1.76)(-1.48)(-1.29)  (-0.23) 
-2.38  1.88  4096  -0.10  -1.16  -1.65  -2.00  -0.11  . 23  2.00 
(-1.55)(2.50)(1.80  )(-0.35 )(-1.76)(-1.48)(-1.29)  (-0.23) 
-3.23  1.99  3484  .  -0.09  -1.42  -1.97  -4.75  0.25  l 23  2.02 
(-1.94)(3.40)(1.55)(-0.33)(-2.20)(-1.73)  (-1.39)  (0.40) 
-3.23  2.24  3484  -0.09  -1.42  -1.97  -4.75  0.25  .23  2.02 
(-1.94)(2.78)(1.55)(-0.33_)(-2.20)(-1.73)  (-1.39)  (0.40) 
The  dependent  variable  is  H,  -  r,.  The  numbers  in  parenthesis  are  t- 
statistics.  \ 
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